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INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION LAW
Liberalizing Scheduled Air Transport
Within the European Community: From the
First Phase to the Second and Beyond
WERNER F. EBKE*
GEORG W. WENGLORZ**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the founding years of the European Community,' the law and
policy of air transport was largely ignored.2 It was not until the end of the
1970's that the First Memorandum of the EC Commission on Air Trans-
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Business and Tax Law Chair, University of
Konstanz School of Law. Referendar (J.D.) 1977; Doktor der Rechte (S.J.D.) 1981, Univer-
sity of Mlnster School of Law; LL.M. 1978, University of California at Berkeley School of
Law. Member, New York Bar. Associate Editor-in-Chief, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
Coeditor-in-Chief, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT.
** Referendar (J.D.) 1989, University of Bonn School of Law. S.J.D. Candidate, Uni-
versity of Konstanz School of Law.
1. Although the European Community ("EC" or "Community") is often thought of as a
single entity, there are three legally independent Communities: the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC"), the European Economic Community ("EEC"), and the European
Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). See Treaty Instituting the European Coal and
Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957); Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958)[hereinafter EEC Treaty or
Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167 (1958). The Merger Treaty of 1965 did not merge the three Communities as
such; rather, the Treaty instituted a single Commission ("EC Commission" or "Commis-
sion") to replace the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community and the
Commissions of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
Community. The Merger Treaty also established a single Council ("Council of Ministers" or
"Council") to replace the separate councils of the three Communities. See Treaty Establish-
ing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 4
I.L.M. 776 (1965). For a general discussion of EC institutions, see T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 8-87 (2d ed. 1988).
2. For a detailed explanation of the reasons, see J. BASEDOW, WETrEEWERB Aur DEN
VERKEHRSMXRKTEN 157-63 (1989).
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port brought about a change to this situation.3 This memorandum was
the catalyst for the dialogue between the EC Commission, the EC Coun-
cil, the European Parliament, and the Member States concerning the fu-
ture development of civil aviation within the Community and beyond.
The efforts were reinforced by the publication of the Second Memoran-
dum of the EC Commission in 1984.
4
As a result of two decisions rendered by the European Court of Jus-
tice in 19855 and 19866 and the impetus provided by the Single European
Act,7 there has been a considerable increase in legislative activity con-
cerning air transport during the last few years.8 The Commission has
proved itself in this respect, to be a major force behind the liberalization
movement. The Council of Ministers only recently came to a decision
3. See AIR TRANSPORT: A COMMUNVrY APPROACH (Memorandum of the Commission),
COM(79) 311 final (July 4, 1979), reprinted in BULL. EuR. COMM. Supp. 5/79 [hereinafter
First Memorandum].
4. See CIVIL AVIATION MEMORANDUM No. 2 - PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COMMUNITY AIR TRANSPORT POLICY, Mar. 15, 1984, COM(84) 72 final, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 182) 1 (July 9, 1984) [hereinafter Second Memorandum].
5. European Parliament v. Council, Case 13/83, [1985] Sammlung der Rechtsprechung
des Gerichtshofes (European Court of Justice Reports) [hereinafter Slg.] 1513.
6. Ministhre Public v. Asjes et al., Cases 209-213/84, [1986] Slg. 1425 [hereinafter
Nouvelles Frontires case].
7. Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (June 29,
1987) (effective July 1, 1987) [hereinafter SEA]. See also the Decision adopted by the For-
eign Ministers on the Occasion of the Signing of the Single European Act, containing a
series of implementing details, 19 BULL. EUR. COMM. 1986/2, at 115-16.
8. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down the
procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air trans-
port sector, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1 (Dec. 31, 1987); Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the application of article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain
categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 374) 9 (Dec. 31, 1987); Council Directive 87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on
fares for scheduled air services between Member States, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L374) 12
(Dec. 31, 1987); Council Decision 87/602/EEC of 14 December 1987 on the sharing of pas-
senger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services between Member States and
on access for air carriers to scheduled air-service routes between Member States, 30 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 19 (Dec. 31, 1987). See also Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
2671/88 of 26 July 1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain catego-
ries of agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices concerning joint planning and coordination of capacity, sharing of revenue,
and consultations on tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports, 31 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 239) 9 (Aug. 30, 1988); Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2672/88 of 26
July 1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agree-
ments between undertakings relating to computer reservation systems for air transport ser-
vices, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 239) 13 (Aug. 30, 1988); Commission Regulation (EEC)
No. 2673/88 of 26 July 1988 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain
categories of agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings
and concerted practices concerning ground handling services, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
239) 17 (Aug. 30, 1988). For a discussion of these Regulations, see Banowsky, Cutting Drag
and Increasing Lift: How Well Will a More Competitive EEC Air Transport Industry Fly?,
24 INT'L LAW. 179 (1990); Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of
EEC Air Transport, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 615 (1988).
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concerning the important question of the Second Phase of the liberaliza-
tion of scheduled air transport.' The pertinent regulations became effec-
tive on November 1, 1990, and they represent a major step towards entry
into the Single European Market on January 1, 1993. The purpose of this
article is to present and critically evaluate the current state of scheduled
air transport deregulation within the EC. The analysis will focus primar-
ily upon the legislative measures promulgated by the Council of Ministers
concerning the Second Phase of air transport liberalization which were
published in August 1990.
In order to evaluate the regulations enacted by the Council, it is nec-
essary to throw some light on the general legal framework of international
air transport. The article will then take a closer look at the pertinent pro-
visions of the EEC Treaty. Finally, the historical process of the liberaliza-
tion of air transport within the EC and the prospects for air transport
deregulation will be analyzed.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD AIR TRANSPORTATION
The present world air transport system is based upon the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, commonly referred to as the Chicago
Convention."0
A. The Chicago Convention
The Chicago Convention was negotiated by 52 nations in 1944,
shortly before the end of World War II when it became apparent that a
new legal framework for world air transport would be necessary." The
Chicago Convention went into effect on April 4, 1947.12 One of the basic
principles of the Convention is that of national air sovereignty. According
to this principle, every nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory."s As a result, every nation has the
9. The "Second Phase" of the liberalization of scheduled air transport consists of the
following three Regulations: Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares
for scheduled air services, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 217) 1 (Aug. 11, 1990); Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No. 2343/90 of 24 July 1990 on access for air carriers to intracommunity sched-
uled air-service routes and on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on
scheduled air services between Member States, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 217) 8 (Aug. 11,
1990); Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2344/90 of 24 July 1990 amending Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 3976/87 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of
agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
217) 15 (Aug. 11, 1990).
10. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1948) [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
11. See A. KARK, DIE LIBERALISIERUNG DER EUROPXISCHEN ZIVILLUFTFAHRT UND DAS
WETTBEWERB SRECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 73 (1989).
12. See Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 91. For a list of countries that have
signed the Chicago Convention, see S. ROSENFIELD, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL AVIATION, Booklet 5, 52-54 (1984).
13. See Chicago Convention, supra note 10, art. 1.
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right to decide upon the distribution of air transport rights to and from
its territory on a case by case basis.
Initially, the parties to the Chicago Convention intended to establish
a multilateral system of transport rights. Due to the uncompromising po-
sitions of the United States which took a very liberal view, and the
United Kingdom which followed a protectionist approach, a comprehen-
sive agreement could not be reached.14 Agreement was only reached with
respect to two of the eight "Freedoms of the Air.""u The two freedoms
agreed upon are commonly known as the "technical freedoms." The fail-
ure to achieve an all-encompassing multilateral agreement concerning air
transport rights at the Chicago conference led, in the following years, to
the system of bilateral agreements that still forms the legal basis of the
current international air transport system.
B. Bilateral Agreements
Over the years, a tight international network of bilateral air transport
agreements concerning scheduled air services has developed between al-
most all countries of the world." The agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom that was negotiated in Bermuda in early
1946 ("Bermuda I Agreement"), served as a model for the majority of
such bilateral agreements. 7 The bilateral air transport agreements of the
Federal Republic of Germany were, and still are, based upon the German
14. For details, see A. KARK, supra note 11, at 73-75; M. DAUTZENBERG, DER BRITISCH/
AMERIKANISCHE KARTELL-RECHTSSTREIT UM DIE IATA-FLUGTARIFE AUS DEM BLICKWINKEL DES
PROTECTION OF TRADING INTERESTS ACT 70-72 (1987).
15. The First through the Fifth Freedoms are defined in article 1(1) of the Interna-
tional Air Transport Agreement, an appendix to the Chicago Convention, supra at 10. The
Sixth through the Eighth Freedoms are combinations of the Third through the Fifth Free-
doms. For a detailed discussion of the First through the Eighth Freedoms, see S. ROSEN-
FIELD, supra note 12, Booklet 3, at 3-6. The First through Fifth Freedoms of the Air read as
follows:
First Freedom: The right to fly across the territory of a foreign country without
landing.
Second Freedom: The right to land for non-commercial purposes (technical op-
erations relating to the aircraft, the crew, refueling, etc.) in the territory of a
foreign country.
Third Freedom: The right to fly from the country of registration to another
country and put down, in the territory of the other country, passengers,
freight, or mail taken aboard in the country of registration.
Fourth Freedom: The right to fly from a foreign country with passengers,
cargo, or mail loaded in that foreign country, to the country of its registration.
Fifth Freedom: The right to transport passengers, mail, or cargo between an-
other contracting state and a third country.
16. There are approximately 2,500 bilateral air transport agreements today. See also L.
WEBER, DIE ZIVILLUFTFAHRT IM EUROPXISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT 47 (1981).
17. See Bermuda Agreement, 60 Stat. 1499, 3 U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter Bermuda I].
The Bermuda I Agreement of 1946 was replaced, in 1977, by another bilateral agreement
between the United States and the United Kingdom ("Bermuda II"). See 1 AIR LAW, ch. IV,
at 30 (C. Shawcross & M. Beaumont eds., 4th ed. 1990).
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Model Draft of a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, which in turn is
based upon the Bermuda I Agreement."s Almost all of the agreements
based upon the Bermuda I Agreement contain the following provisions:
1. The distribution of air transport rights with respect to the
First, Second, Third, and Fourth Freedoms. 1" In some bilateral agree-
ments, the Fifth Freedom is also granted;20
2. The determination of particular flight routes;"'
3. The number of air carriers permitted to make use of the trans-
port rights mentioned above (single or multiple designation);22
4. Determination of capacity (size of aircraft and frequency of
service) ;13
5. The tariff approval process, usually including a double ap-
proval clause.
2 4
Bilateral air transport agreements based upon such provisions thus
regulate market access, the number and scope of air transport rights, ca-
pacity, and tariffs. Almost all bilateral agreements considerably restricted
competition between airlines well into the 1980's, and some of them con-
tinue to do so to this day.25 Specifically, a number of significant aspects of
market structure were excluded from the forces of competition. This is
also true with respect to most bilateral air transport agreements between
Member States of the EC.
C. Tariff Agreements
The network of bilateral air transport agreements has been supple-
mented by tariff agreements between airlines. These tariff agreements
were, and still are, negotiated within the International Air Transport As-
sociation ("IATA"). 2' As a general rule, tariffs are set at IATA confer-
ences and then approved by national governments2 7 Such tariff agree-
ments are reinforced by both EC law and the laws of EC. Member States.
1. EC Law
Under article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty, tariff agreements may be ex-
18. See German Model Draft of a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, reprinted in D.
KLOSTER-HARZ, DIE LUFTVERKEHRSABKOMMEN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND Appendix
I (1976) [hereinafter Model Agreement].
19. Id. art. 2(1)(c).
20. Id. art. 8(3).
21. Id. art. 2(2).
22. Id. art. 3(1).
23. Id. art. 8(4).
24. Id. art. 10(1).
25. See A. KARK, supra note 11, at 77-78.
26. For a general discussion of the functions of IATA, see W. SCHWENK, HANDBUCH DES
LUFTVERKEHRSRECHTS 327-332 (1981); J. BRANCKER, IATA AND WHAT IT DoEs (1977).
27. See generally Bermuda I, supra note 17, Annex II h.
1991
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
empt from European antitrust laws.2" Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty has
been implemented by two EC Regulations.2" Under these Regulations,
tariff "consultations" between airlines are permitted to the extent that
the various conditions of article 4 of Commission Regulation 2671/88 are
met.30 Most importantly, article 4(1)(e) of this Regulation requires that
28. See EEC Treaty, supra at 1, art. 85(3) reads as follows:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings, and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member states
and which have as their object or effect the prevention restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be au-
tomatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
(a) any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
(b) any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
(c) any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerted restrictions which are not indispen-
sable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question.
29. See Council Regulation 3976/87 and Commission Regulation 2671/88, supra at 8.
30. See Commission Regulation 2761/88, supra note 8, art. 4 that reads, in its pertinent
part, as follows:
1. The exemption concerning the holding of consultations on tariffs shall apply
only if:
(a) the consultations are solely intended to prepare jointly tariff proposals
covering scheduled air fares to be paid by members of the public directly to a
participating air carrier or to its authorized agents for carriage as passengers
with their accompanying baggage on a scheduled service and the conditions
under which those fares apply, in application of Article 4 of Directive 87/601/
EEC;
(b) the consultations only concern tariffs subject to approval by the aero-
nautical authorities of the Member States concerned, and do not extend to the
capacity for which such tariffs are to be available;
(c) the tariffs which are subject [sic] of the consultations are applied by
participating air carriers without discrimination on grounds of passengers' na-
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tariff proposals resulting from such "consultations" not be binding.31
Until 1978, IATA member airlines were legally bound to participate
in IATA tariff coordination conferences and to adopt tariffs that were
negotiated at such conferences."2 As a result of the 1978 "show cause or-
der""3 of the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") of the United States, the
IATA regulations were changed. Beginning in 1979, member airlines were
no longer required to participate in, nor to adopt tariffs agreed upon by,
the IATA conferences. Because of the non-binding tariff setting process
within IATA, the participation of European carriers is consistent with the
two Regulations aforementioned. 4
2. German Law
Until December 31, 1989, tariff agreements among airlines were also
exempt from Germany's antitrust laws. According to German law,"9 the
Antitrust Statute did not apply to contracts of companies dealing with
the transportation of persons or goods, if the tariffs for the transport ser-
vices had to be approved by a state agency." Under German law, 7 airline
tariffs must be approved by the Federal Department of Transportation
(Bundesverkehrsministerium).5 Consequently, tariffs agreed upon at
IATA conferences were exempt as a matter of law.
Effective January 1, 1990, however, this policy changed. Under the
new law, 9 contracts of airlines concerning interstate transportation
within the EC are no longer subject to Germany's Antitrust Statute.'0
tionality or place of residence within the Community;
(d) participation in the consultations is voluntary and open to any air car-
rier who operates or has applied to operate on the route concerned;
(e) any draft tariff proposals which may result from the consultations are
not binding on participants, that is to say, following the consultations the par-
ticipants retain the rights to act independently, both in putting forward tariff
proposals for approval independently of the other participants and in freely
applying such tariffs after they have been approved;
(f) the consultations do not entail agreements on agents' remuneration or
other elements of the tariffs discussed;
(g) in respect of each tariff which was the subject of the consultations,
each participant informs the Commission without delay of its submission to
the aeronautical authorities of the Member States concerned.
31. See Id. art. 4(1)(e).
32. See M. DAUTZENRERG, supra note 14, at 80.
33. For details of the "show cause order," see P. BARLOW, AVIATION ANTITRUST 21-23
(1988).
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. See Antitrust Statute [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen], Sept. 24, 1980,
1980 Bundesgesetzblatt!r [German Official Gazette) 1 1761 [hereinafter "BGBI"].
36. See id. art. 99(1).
37. See Air Transport Statute [Luftverkehrsgesetz], Jan. 14, 1981, 1981 BGBI. I 61.
38. See id. art. 21(1).
39. See Antitrust Statute, Dec. 22, 1989, 1989 BGBI. I 2486 [hereinafter 1989 Antitrust
Statute].
40. See id. art. 99(1), No. 1.
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The German legislature has thereby taken account of the fact that EC
law takes priority over the laws of the Member States when air transpor-
tation involving at least two Member States is concerned. How the new
law will affect air transport services rendered solely within Germany re-
mains to be seen.
3. Implementation of IATA Tariff Consultations
In order for a tariff that has been negotiated by participating airlines
at an IATA conference to become effective in a given country, it is neces-
sary that the tariff proposal be approved by the government of that coun-
try."1 In the past, such proposals have almost always been approved.4 2
Accordingly, IATA airlines may in fact be viewed as a price cartel. 43
D. Pooling Agreements
Bilateral air transport agreements are typically supplemented not
only by tariff agreements but also by pooling agreements. Such agree-
ments concern the financial or organizational cooperation of two or more
airlines. Pooling agreements may contain a multitude of regulations.44
Very often they deal with the distribution of earnings from a particular
flight route serviced by two or more airlines. 45 In pooling agreements, air-
lines occasionally agree to restrict the number of flights on a particular
route and to regulate the joint use of airport services.4 Pooling agree-
ments, along with tariff agreements and bilateral agreements, have been
the foundations upon which an almost completely regulated market has
been built.
E. Liberalization Tendencies in Europe
In the last ten years, there has been a tendency towards more liberal
bilateral air transport agreements. In particular, since the 1980's, the
British Government has negotiated procompetitive bilateral air transport
agreements with Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Federal
Republic of Germany. These bilateral agreements were modeled after the
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Luxembourg of March
1985.47 The Air Route Agreement provides for a dismantling of market
41. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 4(1). See also Luftverkehr-
sgesetz, supra note 37, art. 21(1).
42. A. KARK, supra note 11, at 86.
43. Accord J. BASEDOW, supra note 2, at 26. See also D. KASPER, DEREGULATION AND
GLOBALIZATION 49 (1988); G. KNIEPS, DEREGULIERUNG IM LUFTVERKEHR 52 (1987).
44. L. WEBER, supra note 16, at 51-52.
45. See DEREGULATION AND AIRLINE COMPETITION 33-34 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development ed. 1988).
46. W. SCHWENK, supra note 26, at 205.
47. See Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land and Luxembourg to liberalize route access, capacity and tariff approvals, Mar. 21, 1985
[hereinafter Air Route Agreement].
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access and capacity restrictions, as well as introducing the double disap-
proval procedure for tariffs. According to the double disapproval princi-
ple, a tariff proposed by an airline becomes effective unless the govern-
ments of both countries voice their disapproval within an agreed period of
time. Each of the agreements between the United Kingdom and the
aforementioned countries contain similar provisions.4"
While such bilateral agreements may be likely to further the liberali-
zation process within the EC, they are unlikely to accomplish a complete
liberalization of air transport, as not all Member States are prepared to
agree to similar, let alone even more liberal measures."9 If the Single Eu-
ropean Market is to become reality, a comprehensive air transport law
applicable to all EC Member States is an absolute requirement. 50 The
regulations of the Council of Ministers that went into force on November
1, 1990, are an important step towards this goal.5
III. THE EEC TREATY AND EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT POLICY
The EEC Treaty lays the foundations for a European air transport
policy. According to the EEC Treaty, the establishment of a common
market is the Community's primary goal.5' The introduction of a common
transport policy is expressly stated in the Treaty as one of the means of
establishing a common market.5 3 In view of the important role that trans-
port services play in the process of integration of the economies of EC
Member States, the EEC Treaty contains special provisions dealing with
transportation. 4 Of these provisions, only one directly addresses air
48. For details of the various agreements, see A. KARK, supra note 11, at 95-98.
49. Accord A. KARK, supra note 11, at 98.
50. It should be noted that the EC air transport laws enacted in recent years (supra at
8) do not displace the bilateral agreements presently in force between EC Member States.
The EC laws do, however, limit the sovereignty of the Member States where such bilateral
agreements are inconsistent with EC laws.
51. For details of the new regulations, see infra notes 181 through 253 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the EC Commission's proposals on which the new regulations
are based, see Ebke & Wenglorz, Die zweite Stufe der Liberalisierung des
Linienluftverkehrs in der EG: Open Skies in Europa?, 36 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 468, 475-77 (1990).
52. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2. Article 2 reads as follows:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accel-
erated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it.
53. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(e). Article 3, in its pertinent part, reads as
follows:
3. For the purposes set out in art. 2, the activities of the Community shall
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set
out therein:. ...
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport.
54. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 74-84.
1991
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
transport;"' the other provisions apply to road transport, railways, and
inland waterways. Article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty grants the EC Council
of Ministers the power to decide "whether, to what extent and by what
procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air trans-
port." 56 It was not until 1983 that the Council acted pursuant to the pow-
ers granted by article 84(2). This is due to the fact that individual Mem-
ber States' views with respect to both the function of civil aviation and its
implications for the European transport policy differed significantly, and
still do today. 7
A. The French Seamen's Case
EC Member States and the EC Commission have long disagreed on
whether or not the general provisions of the EEC Treaty, including the
antitrust provisions of the Treaty, apply to air transport. The Commis-
sion has always taken the position that the Treaty's general provisions
are applicable to air transport, even though the Treaty leaves the shaping
of specific air transport rules and policies to the Council.5 8 France, on the
other hand, was of the opinion that the general provisions of the EEC
Treaty did not apply to air transport.6 9 The French government argued
that under article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty, air transport, like sea trans-
port, is regulated exclusively by the Council of Ministers." Prior to 1983,
the Council had not, however, taken any action with regard to air
transport.
In 1974, the European Court of Justice had an opportunity, in the
French Seamen's case, to address the related issue of whether the general
provisions of the EEC Treaty apply to sea transport.6 The case arose in
connection with a French law requiring that "leading" positions aboard
French ships be given to French citizens only. The EC Commission was of
the opinion that the French law violated the EEC Treaty. Specifically,
the Commission argued that the French law was contrary to the Treaty's
general provisions on the free movement of labor.2 In its decision the
55. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), which in 1974 read as follows:
2. The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and
by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air
'transport.
Due to the Single European Act (see supra at 7) art. 84(2) was changed in 1987. It now
reads:
2. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, decide whether, to what
extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea
and air transport.
56. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2).
57. For a detailed exposition of the reasons for the different views of the Member
States, see L. WEBER, supra note 16, at 88-89.
58. Id. at 97-98.
59. Id. at 98.
60. Id.
61. Commission v. France, Case 167/73, [1974] Slg. 359.
62. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 48-51.
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European Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's view that the gen-
eral provisions of the EEC Treaty apply to all transport services, includ-
ing sea transport. The Court held that while they are not subject to the
specific provisions of the EEC Treaty concerning transport services," air
and sea transport services, like other transport services (i.e., road trans-
port, railways, inland waterways), are subject to the general provisions of
the EEC Treaty. 4 Although it did not concern air transport, the Court's
decision provided an important signal for the integration of air transport
within the Community.6
5
B. Aftermath
Unfortunately, in the years following the Court's decision in the
French Seamen's case,6 6 the Council used its powers under article 84(2)
of the EEC Treaty with a great deal of reluctance. Many of the proposals
of the EC Commission concerning the establishment of a competitive air
transport system amounted to nothing, or were postponed from one
Council meeting to the next.17 The goal of a common air transport policy
was not realized due to a lack of political will on the part of a majority of
Member States. According to one commentator, air transport policy de-
veloped into "a dark chapter in the history of European integration.""8
The European Parliament seemed to have agreed with this view. In
1983, the Parliament took the unusual step of taking the Council to court,
under article 175 of the EEC Treaty, 9 for its inactivity in the entire area
of transport policy. The Parliament argued that the Council had failed to
introduce a common transport policy, or to provide a binding framework
for such a policy, and that the Council had thereby violated the EEC
63. Id. arts. 74-83.
64. See Commission, [1974] Slg. at 371.
65. See L. WEBER, supra note 16, at 89.
66. Commission, (1974] Slg. at 359.
67. Basedow, Der europkische Verkehrsmarkt als Rechtsproblem, 12 TRANSPORTRECHT
402, 403 (1989).
68. Schr~tter, Europ~iische Verkehrspolitik auf dem Prafstand - Das Unttltigkeit-
surteil des EuGH vom 22. Mai 1985 aus integrations-und verkehrspolitischer Sicht, in 2
AKTUELLE RECHTSFRAGEN - MISCELLANIA 70-72 (I. Seidl-Hohenveldern ed. 1987).
69. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 175 which reads as follows:
Should the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this Treaty, fail
to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Community may
bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement
established.
The action shall be admissible only if the institution concerned has first
been called upon to act. If, within two months of being so called upon, the
institution concerned has not defined its position, the action may be brought
within a further period of two months.
Any natural or legal person may, under the condition laid down in the
preceding paragraphs, complain to the Court of Justice that an institution of
the Community has failed to address to that person any act other than a rec-
ommendation or an opinion.
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Treaty.7 0
C. Transport Policy Decision
In 1985, the European Court of Justice held partly in favor of the
European Parliament.7' The Court opined that the EEC Treaty's provi-
sions that generally required a common transport policy within the Com-
munity, were not sufficiently concrete to be actionable.7 2 The Court deter-
mined that articles 75(1)(a) and (b) of the EEC Treaty were adequately
clear to require the Council of Ministers to take appropriate actions to
implement a policy of intra-community transportation and to regulate
cabotage rights.73 According to the Court, the failure of the Council to act
in accordance with articles 75(1)(a) and (b) of the EEC Treaty consti-
tuted an inactivity amounting to a violation of the Treaty.74 The Court
set no deadline by which time the Council had to meet its obligations
under these articles; rather, the Court granted the Council a "reasonable
period of time" to take appropriate actions.
75
At first glance, the Court's decision may appear to be of relatively
little importance inasmuch as it only reiterated the principle of freedom
of trade in services provided for in the EEC Treaty. The decision had,
however, far-reaching political implications. Only a few months after the
Court's decision, the Council of Ministers presented a Master Plan Con-
cerning Transport Policy76 that, among other areas of transport services,
70. The Parliament claimed that the Council's failure to act constituted a violation of
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(e), art. 61, art. 74, art. 75, and art. 84. Art. 61 reads, in its
pertinent part, as follows:
1. Freedom to provide services in the field of transport shall be governed by
the provisions of the Title relating to transport.
Article 74 reads as follows:
The objectives of this Treaty shall, in matters governed by this Title, be pur-
sued by Member States within the framework of a common transport policy.
Article 75 reads, in its pertinent part, as follows:
1. For the purpose of implementing Art. 74, and taking into account the dis-
tinctive features of transport, the Council shall, acting unanimously until the
end of the second stage and by qualified majority thereafter, lay down, on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee and the Assembly:
(a) common rules applicable to international transport to or from the ter-
ritory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Mem-
ber States;
(b) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate trans-
port services within a Member State.
71. European Parliament v. Council, Case 13/83, [1985] Slg. 1513. For a general discus-
sion of this case, see P. DAGTOGLOU, AIR TRANSPORT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 50-75
(1989).
72. European Parliament, [1985] Slg. at 1596-1600.
73. Id. at 1600-1601.
74. Id. at 1600.
75. Id.
76. See Masterplan, BULL. EUR. COMM. 11/85 at 81 (1985).
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affected air transport. Additionally, the Council set a seven year time
limit within which substantial progress in regard to the freedom of trade
in services had to be accomplished." The Council also accepted the pro-
posals made in the EC Commission's White Paper on the Completion of
the Internal Market."8 The White Paper contained a detailed plan of ac-
tions for the integration of the transportation markets. At roughly the
same time, the governments of the EC Member States arrived at an
agreement concerning the Single European Act(the "SEA")."9 The SEA
amended the EEC Treaty and provided the foundation for the Single Eu-
ropean Market.
On the basis of these measures, the Council and the Commission of
the EC have become very active in the field of air transportation."0 With
its decisions in the French Seamen's case" and the Transport Policy
case, 2 the European Court of Justice made a significant contribution to
the establishment of European Community transport policy which should
not be underestimated. These decisions helped accelerate the process of
European integration towards a common market.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE. EC AIR TRANSPORT POLICY PRIOR TO
DECEMBER 1987
The first major step towards the development of a common, liberal-
ized air transport system within the European Community was taken by
the Commission in 1979 with the publication of its First Memorandum. 3
A. The First Memorandum
The First Memorandum was based upon a detailed analysis of EC air
transport policies existing prior to 1979. On the basis of this analysis, the
Memorandum set forth the short, intermediate, and long term objectives
relating to a common air transport policy within the EC. It also proposed
possible and desireable measures for effecting their implementation. 4
Most importantly, the Memorandum underscored the need for a change
to the then existing market structures.
In the following years, the First Memorandum provoked a broad dis-
cussion of the proposed measures among all concerned, including airlines,
the EC Commission, the EC Council, and the EC Member States.
77. See Schr6tter, supra note 68, at 84.
78. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market
(White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, June 28-29, 1985),
COM(85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
79. See SEA, supra at 7.
80. See, e.g., the measures concerning the First and Second Phase of air transport liber-
alization, supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
81. Commission, [1974] Slg. at 359.
82. European Parliament, [1985] Slg. at 1513.
83. See First Memorandum, supra at 3.
84. See First Memorandum, supra note 3, at 20-26.
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B. Inter-regional Air Services Directive
After intensive discussions, the EC Council, at the suggestion of the
EC Commission, promulgated the first directive for the liberalization of
air transport.8 5 The impact of this directive however, was limited. The
directive applied only to international flights within the Community by
aircraft with no more than 70 seats over a distance of at least 400 kilome-
ters.86 In addition, the directive only pertained to flights into small air-
ports (i.e., category II and III airports) . 7 As a result, the practical impor-
tance of the Council's first step towards air transport liberalization
remained modest."8
It was not until 1989, that the Inter-regional Air Services Directive
was further liberalized.89 As a result of the 1989 amendments to the Di-
rective, airlines were allowed to service routes under 400 kilometers.' 0
Furthermore, aircraft size restrictions were removed.' Regarding this
rather advanced step towards the aim of a deregulated framework for re-
gional air transport services, the Council has adopted the Commission's
attitude. This attitude, developed in recent years, is that regional air ser-
vice between Member States is to be strongly promoted in order to take
pressure off the large congested airports within the Community.
C. The Second Memorandum
In view of the world-wide crisis in civil aviation at the beginning of
the 1980's and the increased competitive pressure upon both the airline
and the aircraft industry, the EC Commission published a Second Memo-
randum on Civil Aviation." This Memorandum reflected the United
States' experience with airline deregulation, which had its roots in the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.'3 The Second Memorandum set forth
85. See Directive (83/416/EEC) concerning the authorization 'of scheduled inter-re-
gional air services for the transport of passengers, mail, and cargo between Member States,
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 237) 19 (July 25, 1983) [hereinafter Inter-regional Air Services
Directive].
86. Id. art. 1(a)-(c).
87. See id. Appendix A.
88. For details, see A. KARK, supra note 11, at 116.
89. See Council Directive 89/463/EEC of 18 July 1989 amending Directive 83/416/EEC
concerning the authorization of scheduled inter-regional air services for the transport of
passengers, mail and cargo between Member States, 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 226) 14
(Aug. 3, 1989).
90. See id. art. 1.
91. Id.
92. See Second Memorandum, supra at 4.
93. See Airline Deregulation Act, 92 Stat. 1705. For an exposition on the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act and its consequences see, Ebke & Wittmann, Wettbewerb im Linienluftverkehr:
Erfahrungen mit der Deregulierung in den USA, 36 RIW 962 (1990); Goetz & Dempsey,
Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something Foul in the Air, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 927
(1989); E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985).
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the major features of a future common air transport policy for the EC.94
The Commission was primarily concerned with the regulation and crea-
tion of conditions for a competitive market for scheduled air transport.
9 5
The Memorandum was aimed at a liberalization of the existing bilateral
air transport agreements. The deregulation envisaged by the Second
Memorandum included only the EC Member States. Air transport be-
tween EC Member States and third countries would be deregulated at a
later date."
D. The Nouvelles Fronti~res Case
The Second Memorandum of the EC Commission and the decision of
the European Court of Justice in the Transport Policy case 97 increased
pressure on the EC Council to take effective measures towards the liber-
alization of EC air transport. The discussions within the Council proved
to be difficult and time consuming. It was the European Court of Justice
that finally took the lead in the liberalization process. In April 1986, the
Court handed down the single most important decision relating to the
liberalization of EC air transport.9 s The case, commonly known as the
Nouvelles Frontires case, involved the issue of whether a travel agency
registered in an EC Member State has the right to sell airline tickets at
fares below the tariffs agreed upon by IATA-airlines and approved by the
Member States' government.
In its decision, the Court held that the Community's antitrust laws,
in particular articles 851" and 86100 of the EEC Treaty, are as a general
rule applicable to civil aviation.10 ' The Court, however, qualified its hold-
94. See Second Memorandum, supra note 4, at 21-28.
95. See id. at 28-40.
96. See id. at 21.
97. European Parliament, [1985] Slg. at 1513..
98. MinistAre Public v. Asjes et al., Cases 209-213/84, [1986] Slg. 1425. For a general
discussion of this case, see P. DAGTOGLOU, supra note 71, at 77-114. See also Note, New
Frontiers in EEC Air Transport Competition, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 455 (1987).
99. For the text of EEC Treaty, see supra note 1, art. 85. See also supra at 28.
100. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86 that reads as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompati-
ble with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or un-
fair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contacts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contacts.
101. Minist6re Public v. Asjes [1986] Slg. at 1463-1466.
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ing by stating that articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty cannot be en-
forced directly by the Commission or the Member States until these pro-
visions are implemented by secondary Community law, such as
implementing regulations or directives (as required by article 87 of the
EEC Treaty).102 Pointing to articles 88103 and 89104 of the EEC Treaty,
the Court suggested that the Commission and the competent authorities
of the Member States take appropriate measures to enforce the general
principles underlying articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.'0 5 Citing its
decision in the Bosch case,106 the Court made it very clear that the en-
102. See id. 1466-1470. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 87 reads as follows:
1. Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to
the principles set out in Arts. 85 and 86.
If such provisions have not been adopted within the periods mentioned, they
shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed, in
particular:
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Art. 85(1)
and in Art. 86 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments;
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Art. 85(3), taking into
account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to sim-
plify administration to the greatest possible extend on the other;
(c) to define, if needed be, in the various branches of the economy, the
scope of the provisions of Arts. 85 and 86;
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court
of Justice in applying the provisions laid down in this paragraph;
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the provi-
sions contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article.
103. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88 reads as follows:
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Art. 87,
the authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements,
decisions and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant position in the
common market in accordance with the law of their country and with the pro-
visions of Art. 85, in particular paragraph 3, and of Art. 86.
104. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 89 reads as follows:
1. Without prejudice to Art. 88, the Commission shall, as soon as it takes up its
duties, ensure the application of the principles laid down in Arts. 85 and 86.
On application by a Member State or on its own initiative, and in co-operation
with the competent authorities in the Member States, who shall give it their
assistance, the Commission shall investigate cases of suspected infringement of
these principles. If it finds that there has been an infringement, it shall pro-
pose appropriate measures to bring it to an end.
2. If the infringement is not brought to an end, the Commission shall record
such infringement of the principles in a reasoned decision. The Commission
may publish its decision and authorize Member States to take the measures,
the conditions and details of which it shall determine, needed to remedy the
situation.
105. Minist~re Public v. Asjes, [1986] Slg. at 1469.
106. Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Gens en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH, Case 13/
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forcement procedure of articles 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty is not capa-
ble of assuring complete compliance with articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty."0 7
Due to the limited applicability of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty, the Court's decision provides no answer to the question of
whether IATA tariff agreements are in compliance with EC law. The
Court's decision is also politely silent on the issue of whether or not
Member States are in breach of the EEC Treaty when they approve tar-
iffs agreed to at IATA conferences. Despite its limited holding, the
Court's decision has had an immediate impact. In view of the Court's em-
phasis of the Commission's responsibilities under article 89 of the EEC
Treaty, the Commission proceeded against ten major European airlines
for violation of article 85 of the EEC Treaty.108 With the Commission's
threat of a lawsuit against them looming ahead, the airlines eventually
agreed, among other things, to bring their tariff, capacity, and pooling
agreements into compliance with the EC antitrust laws. 0 9
E. The Single European Act
The decisive step towards the liberalization of scheduled air trans-
port within the Community was finally brought about by the Single Euro-
pean Act, which went into effect on July 1, 1987.110 The Single European
Act provides for the establishment of a Single European Market for air
transport.' Most importantly, decisions concerning the establishment of
a single market for air transport no longer require unanimous voting by
Member States; rather, measures can now be taken by a majority of
votes. 12
In June 1987, after intensive discussions, the Council agreed upon a
package of measures for the liberalization of scheduled air transport.'
1 3
The implementation of these measures was delayed by a veto of the
Spanish government."" The Spanish government was unwilling to accept
the application of the EC liberalization measures to Gibraltar airport, as
Spain still contests British sovereignty over Gibraltar. The concerns of
the Spanish government were overcome by the end of 1987. The Council's
compromise cleared the way for the First Phase of the process of liberal-
izing air transport within the EC.
61, [1962] Slg. 97.
107. Ministres Public v. Asjes, [1986] Slg. at 1469.
108. These airlines included Air France, Aer Lingus, Alitalia, British Airways, British
Caledonian, KLM, Deutsche Lufthansa, Olympic, Sabena, and SAS.
109. See A. KARK, supra note 11, at 130-31; Lenz, Die Verkehrspolitik der Europi-
ischen Gemeinschaften im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes, 23 EUROPARECHT
[EuR] 158, 173 (1988).
110. See SEA, supra at 7.
111. See id. art. 13.
112. Id. art. 16.
113. See Dempsey, supra note 8, at 671-72.
114. Id. at 672.
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V. THE FIRST PHASE
In December 1987, the Council took a number of measures toward
the liberalization of air transport that are commonly referred to as the
First Package of Liberalization. This Package consists of the following: a
Council Directive on tariffs, a Council Decision concerning capacity shar-
ing and market access, a Council Regulation concerning the application of
the EC antitrust laws to the air transport sector, and a Council Regula-
tion concerning exemptions from EC antitrust laws.11 5
The measures mentioned are applicable only to flights between EC
Member States. They do not apply to domestic flights within a given
Member State, nor do they apply to flights between a Member State and
third countries.11 Rights and obligations of Member States vis-a-vis their
airlines are not subject to the First Package. The regulation of domestic
air transport remains the responsibility of each Member State. The First
Package affects the Member States' sovereign rights with respect to mar-
ket access for intracommunity flights, capacity sharing, and tariff ap-
proval. To illustrate the significance of the First Package, we shall take a
closer look at the various provisions.
A. Antitrust Regulations
For the first time in the history of the European Community, the
Council Regulation (EEC) 3975/871" effected the application of articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to airline companies in regards to flights
between EC airports."'s The Regulation also grants the EC Commission
power to investigate and impose sanctions on both airlines and Member
States for violations of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.1 9
According to Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87,120 the Commission
may, by means of a further regulation, exempt from EC antitrust laws
certain categories of agreements and concerted practices of airlines. 121
Such group exemptions are generally permitted under article 85(3) of the
EEC Treaty.1 22 Group exemptions may be subject to certain conditions
and specific requirements.1 2 In case of a breach of an obligation that was
attached by the Commission to an exemption, the exemption may be re-
voked." The Commission may also impose a fine on airlines that violate
a granted exemption. 26 The following activities between airlines may be
115. See supra at 8.
116. See, e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) 3975/87, supra note 8, art. 1(2).
117. See id.
118. Id. art. 1.
119. Id. arts. 3-6.
120. See Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87, supra at 8.
121. Id. art. 2.
122. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(3). See supra note 28 for text of art. 85(3).
123. See Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87, supra note 8, art. 2(3).
124. Id. art. 7.
125. Id. art. 7(2).
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exempt: agreements concerning slot allocation, flight schedules, the joint
acquisition of computer reservation systems, the maintenance of aircraft,
tariff setting, the coordination of capacities, and the division of earnings
from scheduled flights (i.e., pooling agreements).2 8
Without delay, the Commission made use of its powers pursuant to
article 2 of Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87 by promulgating three reg-
ulations."'7 These regulations set forth the prerequisites for group exemp-
tions with respect to the activities mentioned above. Those exemptions
granted by the Commission were far-reaching and remained effective un-
til January 1, 1991. "' For example, airlines were permitted to continue to
cooperate with other airlines on the basis of the above mentioned agree-
ments. Thus, the exemptions provided the airlines concerned with a sig-
nificant amount of protection in an increasingly competitive market.
B. Tariffs
Council Directive 87/601/EEC2 8 on tariffs for scheduled flights be-
tween Member States maintains the traditional tariff approval proce-
dure.130 Hence, a tariff becomes effective only if it has been approved by
the governments of both Member States. 1 ' The substantive prerequisites
for the approval of a proposed tariff are set forth in article 3 of the Direc-
tive. According to this provision, a tariff proposed by an airline shall be
approved by the government if they are reasonably related to long-term,
fully allocated costs of the applicant carrier.' 2 Under article 3 of the Di-
rective, the fact that the proposed air fare is lower than that offered by
another carrier, on the same route, is not a sufficient reason for withhold-
ing approval.133
Tariff proposals may be made by an airline alone or after consulta-
tions with other airlines.3 In the latter case, the consultations must con-
form to Commission Regulation 3976/87.1" Article 7 of Council Directive
87/601/EEC provides a detailed procedure of notification and the consul-
tation and arbitration process, should a Member State withhold
approval. 3 '
The Tariff Directive introduces a new tariff approval concept that
the Directive refers to as "zones of flexibility.' 3 7 Proposed tariffs that are
126. Id. art. 2(2).
127. See Commission Regulations (EEC) 2671/88, 2672/87 and 2673/87, supra at 8.
128. See, e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) 2671/88, supra note 8, art. 8.
129. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra at 8.
130. Id. art. 4.
131. Id. art. 4.
132. Id. art. 3.
133. Id.
134. Id. art. 4(1).
135. See Council Regulation (EEC) 3976/87, supra at 8.
136. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra note 8, art. 7.
137. Id. art. 5.
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within the margins of such zones of flexibility, are to be approved auto-
matically by the governments concerned.13 8 The Directive creates two dis-
count zones. In the first zone (i.e., the discount zone), the discount is 10
to 35 percent of the reference tariff."' 9 In the second (i.e., the deep dis-
count zone), the discount of the reference tariff may be between 35 and
55 percent. '  Discount tickets are subject to considerable restrictions.1 4 1
Still, member states are free to agree to more liberal discount practices
than those set forth in the Tariff Directive. 142
C. Market Access and Capacity Sharing
The Council Decision 87/602/EEC liberalizes market access and ca-
pacity sharing. 4 s Bilateral agreements have traditionally provided for an
equal (50:50) sharing of passenger capacity based upon the number of
passengers of one airline on a given route. The Decision aims at a liberali-
zation of firm sharing clauses. According to the Decision, airlines may in-
crease or decrease their capacity by 5 percent, a capacity sharing ratio of
55:45.1" The country in which the airline is registered may not interfere
for the benefit of its airline. Effective October 1, 1989, the ratio was
changed to 60:40.'4
For the first time in the history of EC air transport law, the Council
Decision grants every Member State the right of multiple designations.
Each Member State may appoint more than one airline to service a given
bilateral route, to the extent that the route is used by a certain number of
passengers.1'4
The Decision also permits Community carriers to establish flight con-
nections between major airports (i.e., category I airports)'14 in their home
138. Id. art. 5(2).
139. Id. art. 5(1).
140. Id.
141. Id. Annex II.
142. Id. art. 6.
143. See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra at 8.
144. Id. art. 3(1).
145. Id. art. 3(2).
146. Id. art. 5(2) which reads as follows:
A Member State shall also accept multiple designation on a country-pair basis
by another Member State:
1. in the first year after the notification of this Decision, on routes on which
more than 250,000 passenger were carried in the preceding year,
2.in the second year, on routes on which more than 200,000 passengers were
carried in the preceding year or on which there are more than 1,200 return
flights per annum,
3. in the third year, on routes on which more than 180,000 passengers were
carried in the preceding year or on which there are more than 1,000 return
flights per annum.
147. Category I airports are listed in Annex II to Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra
note 8, at 25.
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country and regional airports (i.e., category II and III airports)' s of an-
other Member State, regardless of distance or aircraft size."19 In addition,
Community carriers are entitled to introduce scheduled air services to
and from two or more points in other Member States, provided that no
traffic rights are exercised between the combined points. 150
Most importantly, Community carriers may also carry out scheduled
flights falling within the Fifth Freedom if certain conditions are met. The
flight route thus needs to include at least one regional airport and the
first or final airport must be within the home country of the carrier. In
addition, the flight service in question may not exceed more than 30 per-
cent of the annual capacity of the airline on any given route.' 5'
D. Critique
The First Package was a cautious and conservative step toward more
competition in scheduled air transport within the Community. Radical
changes to the market structure were not accomplished by the new laws.
Rather, the reforms were relatively minor since they were coupled with
generous exemptions for EC carriers from the EC antitrust laws. There-
fore, it should not come as a surprise that the First Package had only
modest effects on both airlines and passengers.1 52 Despite a few market
entries and the establishment of many new flight routes," 3 the develop-
ment of air fares has remained a disappointment given the Commission's
high expectations. The measures did not result in noticeable tariff reduc-
tions. "'54 Consequently, additional more far-reaching measures are neces-
sary if the objective of competitive market structures, in the area of
scheduled air transport within the EC, is to be accomplished by January
1993.
VI. THE Ahmed Saeed CASE
In April 1989, the European Court of Justice took the opportunity, in
Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekiampfung unlauteren
Wettbewerbs e.V.,"'8 to comment on the First Package position concern-
148. Category II and III airports are also listed in Annex II to Council Decision 87/602/
EEC, supra note 8, at 25.
149. See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra note 8, art. 6(1).
150. See id. art. 7(1).
151. Id. art. 8(1).
152. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Report on the first year
(1988) of implementation of the aviation policy approved in December 1978, COM(89) 476
final (Oct. 2, 1989).
153. Id. at 7-12.
154. Accord Sir Leon Brittan, EC Commissioner of Competition, in a lecture presented
at the Inaugural Conference of the European Air Law Association held in London on No-
vember 2, 1989, reprinted in AIR TRANSPORT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: RECENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS (P. Dagtoglou ed. 1991) (forthcoming).
155. Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen et al. v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung unlauteren
Wettbewerbs e.V., Case 66/86, reprinted in 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR LUFT-UND WELTRAUMRECHT
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ing the new legal situation in EC air transport. This case involved two
travel agencies in Frankfurt, Germany, that had sold tickets at fares that
were up to 60 percent less than those approved by the German govern-
ment. For this purpose, the travel agencies purchased tickets outside of
Germany for flights originating in the country of purchase with a destina-
tion in a third country outside the EC, but having a stopover in a German
airport.
In the lawsuit brought by the Association for the Protection Against
Unfair Trade Practices in Germany, the plaintiff alleged that the two
travel agencies had violated German law by selling the tickets above-de-
scribed. It was argued that the agencies had violated the German Air
Transport Statute,"6 which prohibits the application of air fares not ap-
proved by the German government. It was further argued that the agen-
cies had engaged in unfair trade practices, insofar as the fares for the
tickets sold undercut the approved tariff applied by their competitors.
The lower courts held in favor of the Association. The Bundesgerichtshof,
Germany's highest court in civil and commercial matters, granted the writ
of certiorari and submitted the case to the European Court of Justice for
a preliminary ruling pursuant to article 177 of the EEC Treaty.'57 The
European Court of Justice concluded that tariff setting agreements be-
tween carriers constituted illegal cartels and therefore violated article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty. L5 8
A. Assumptions of the Court
The holding of the Court is based upon the assumption that article
[ZLW] 124 (1989) [hereinafter Ahmed Saeed]. For a general discussion of this case see P.
DAGTOGLOU, supra note 71, at 133-146.
156. See Air Transport Statute, supra at 37.
157. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177(3), which reads as follows:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before a court or tribunal of one of the Mem-
ber States, such court or tribunal may, if it considers that its judgment de-
pends on a preliminary decision on this question, request the Court of Justice
to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court or
tribunal from whose decisions no appeal lies under municipal law, such court
or tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
For a discussion of the procedures under art. 177, see G. BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 366-452 (1981); T. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 246-
282.
158. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 127.
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85 of the EEC Treaty was directly applicable to the case at hand. This
assumption went beyond the holding in the Nouvelles Fronti&res case. 159
In that case, the Court held that because of the lack of implementing
Community legislation, article 85 of the EEC Treaty could not be en-
forced directly; rather, the Commission and the competent authorities of
the Member States could take measures against airlines only pursuant to
articles 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty. If article 85 of the EEC Treaty is
directly applicable, the Commission no longer needs to utilize the proce-
dures provided for in article 89 of the EEC Treaty. Rather, the Commis-
sion may proceed directly under article 85 of the EEC Treaty as imple-
mented by Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87.160
B. Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
In Ahmed Saeed, the European Court of Justice explicitly stated
that tariff setting agreements constitute illegal cartels and violate article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty.161 According to Council Regulation 3976/87,
such agreements may not be subject to group exemptions. 63 The Court
pointed out that tariff "consultations," as opposed to tariff "agreements,"
remain exempt. 6 ' The criteria for differentiating between permissible
tariff consultations and illegal tariff agreements are set forth in article 4
of Commission Regulation 2671/88.164 Consequently, tariff agreements for
intracommunity flights that did not fall within the group exemption were
void per se, unless an objection made by the carrier concerned under arti-
cle 5 of Council Regulation 3975/87 was successful.'65 With respect to do-
mestic flights and flights between a Member State and a third country,
the procedure pursuant to articles 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty remains
applicable. "
C. Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
The statements of the European Court of Justice as to article 86 of
the EEC Treaty are particularly interesting. The Court suggests that the
abuse-of-market-power provisions of article 86 of the EEC Treaty apply
to the entire air transport sector. That is to say that article 86 of the EEC
Treaty applies to intracommunity flights, to domestic flights and flights
from an EC Member State to a third country.'67 Consequently, tariff
159. See Ministere Public v. Asjes et al., Cases 209-213/84 [1986] Slg. 1425. For details,
see supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
160. See Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87, supra note 8.
161. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 127.
162. Id. at 127.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 128. See also Commission Regulation 2671/88, supra note 8, art. 4. The text
of this regulation is reprinted supra at 30.
165. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 127.
166. Id. at 128. For details of the procedures under arts. 88 and 89 of the EEC Treaty,
see supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
167. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 129.
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agreements concerning flights from an airport of an EC Member State to
an airport outside of the Community fall as much within the ambit of
article 86 of the EEC Treaty, as do tariff agreements concerning in-
tracommunity and domestic flights. This is particularly true in cases
where an airline company is in a position to control the market or to
charge excessively high or extremely low tariffs on a given route.168
According to the Court, the fact that article 86 of the EEC Treaty
has not been implemented by secondary Community law does not prevent
the Commission from enforcing the provision.'6 9 Member States' courts
may also enforce article 86 of the EEC Treaty, even absent secondary
Community law implementing said Treaty provision.1 7 0  For the
Bundesgerichtshof, this was an important observation, as it had to decide
the issue of whether a court may enforce article 86 of the EEC Treaty
despite the lack of implementing Community legislation.
D. Articles 5 and 90 of the EEC Treaty
Based upon its conclusions with respect to articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty, the European Court of Justice stated that a Member State
violates Community law (i.e., its obligations under article 51M and article
90(1)72 of the EEC Treaty) if it approves tariffs that are contrary to arti-
cle 85 or article 86 of the EEC Treaty. s17 As a result, the Member States'
governments are required, in the approval process, to assure that the
tariff consultations are in conformity with the principles laid down in ar-
ticles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, as well as Council Directive 87/601/
EEC and Commission Regulation 2671/88."" The Court also made it per-
fectly clear that it expects the Member States not to enter into new bilat-
eral agreements with third countries that, directly or indirectly, provide
for illegal tariffs. " 5
168. Id. at 130-131.
169. Id. at 129.
170. Id..at 130-131.
171. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5 reads as follows:
Member States shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting
from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate
the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any mea-
sure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
172. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90 reads, in its pertinent part, as follows:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor
maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty,
in particular to those rules provided for in Art. 7 and Arts. 85 through 94.
173. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 131.
174. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC and Commission Regulation (EEC) 2671/88,
supra at 8.
175. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 131-132.
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E. Analysis
In the Ahmed Saeed case, there are two issues concerning the tariff
setting process worth noting. By extending the application of article 86 of
the EEC Treaty to flights between Member States and third countries,
the Court put considerable pressure on the Member States to make sure
that tariff setting and tariff approval provisions in bilateral agreements
are consistent with EC antitrust laws. As a result, existing agreements
that are contrary to article 86 of the EEC Treaty need to be renegotiated.
Also, the applicability of article 86 to agreements concerning flights from
within the Community to third countries is an extension of existing EC
Laws"' not only to intracommunity flights but also to both domestic
flights within an EC Member State and flights to third countries.
The European Court of Justice rendered its decision in the Ahmed
Saeed case just as the Commission was about to finish its work on the
proposals for the Second Phase of Liberalization. Nevertheless, the Com-
mission managed to include the implications of the Ahmed Saeed deci-
sion in its proposals for the Second Phase of liberalization. 17 7
VII. THE SECOND PHASE
In September 1989, the EC Commission published proposals for fur-
ther liberalization of EC scheduled air transport. 17  The proposals are
aimed at the relaxation of tariffs, capacity sharing, and market access. On
the basis of the Commission's proposals, the Council of the EC Transport
Ministers, at its meeting in June 1990, agreed to a package of measures,
commonly referred to as the Second Phase of the liberalization of EC air
transport. These measures consist of three Council Regulations, two of
which 1 79 became effective November 1, 1990.180
A. Tariffs
The new Tariff Regulation is the centerpiece of the second package.
This Regulation provides more flexibility in the tariff setting and ap-
proval process. While the requirement that tariffs be approved by the af-
fected governments remains unchanged, " both the approval procedure
and the range of approvable fares have changed considerably. Most im-
portantly, the 1990 Tariff Regulation introduces, for the first time in the
history of EC air transport laws, the double disapproval system. " The
Regulation did not, however, go so far as to permit the double disap-
176. See Council Regulations, Directive and Decision, supra at 8.
177. See COM(89) 417 final (Sept. 8,1989) at 1-5.
178. COM(89) 373 final and COM(89) 417 final (Sept. 8, 1989). For a detailed discus-
sion of the Commission's proposals see Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 51, at 475-477.
179. See Council Regulations 2342/90 and 2343/90, supra at 9.
180. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 14.
181. See id. art. 4(1).
182. Id. art. 4(4).
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proval system to be applied to all tariffs, as proposed by the EC Commis-
sion. ' Rather, the double disapproval system applies only to tariffs that
exceed the reference tariff by at least 5 percent.8 4
The First Phase system of reference tariffs and flexibility zones was
revised. The Tariff Regulation allows Community carriers to set the price
for a "normal economy class ticket," independently, ' within a margin of
plus or minus 5 percent of the reference tariff.186 Under the First Phase,
the price for an economy class ticket was fixed at 100 percent of the refer-
ence tariff. The margins of the discount zone were changed from between
90 and 65 percent to between 94 and 80 percent. The margins of the deep
discount zone were broadened from between 65 and 45 percent to be-
tween 79 and 30 percent.1 8 7 The diagram in Table 1 illustrates the differ-
ences concerning the zones of flexibility between the First and Second
Phase:
The prerequisites for attaining a ticket within the discount zone have
been eased. Prior to November 1, 1990, the journey had to include at
least one Saturday night and a total of six nights, or alternatively, had to
take place during off-peak times.'"8 Under the new Tariff Regulation,
these requirements, particularly detrimental to business travelers, no
longer exist."89 This impressive move towards more flexibility for a pas-
senger wanting to acquire lower priced tickets is counteracted by the fact
that the discount zone was reduced from 35 to 14 percent. 190 The reduc-
tion is not offset by the increase in the margins of the deep discount zone
from 20 to 49 percent. For the most part, the restrictive requirements for
entering the deep discount zone continue to be in effect.' 9'
183. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), art. 4(3).
184. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 4(4). The reference tariff is
described in more detail infra, note 186.
185. Id. art. 4(3).
186. The reference tariff is defined in Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art.
2(i) which reads as follows:
Reference fare means the normal one way or return, as appropriate, economy
air fare charged by a third or fourth freedom air carrier on the route in ques-
tion; if more than one such fare exists, the arithmetic average of all such fares
shall be taken unless otherwise bilaterally agreed; where there is no normal
economy fare, the lowest fully flexible fare shall be taken.
187. Id. art. 4(3).
188. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra note 8, Annex II No. 1.
189. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, Annex II No. 1.
190. Id. art. 4(3).
191. Id. Annex II, No. 2.
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TABLE 1
777777
Discount/
zone
discount\
z one
1st Phase
(Jan. 1988)
90%
65%
65%
540W
105%-95%
94%1
80%
79%
30%
2nd Phase
(Nov. 1990)
1. The Tariff Approval Process
According to the new Tariff Regulation, tariff approval follows from
one of three procedures:
a. Automatic Approval
If the proposed tariff of an airline lies within one of the aforemen-
tioned flexibility zones, the governments of the Member States are re-
quired to approve the tariff.1 9 2 This results in a system of automatic ap-
proval, as the approval itself is merely a formality if other conditions,
particularly for those set forth in article 3 of the Tariff Regulation, are
fulfilled.
192. Id. art. 4(3).
100 _r
1991
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
b. Double Disapproval
If a tariff proposed by an airline lies above the zones mentioned in
article 4(3) of the Tariff Regulation (i.e., if it is more than 5 percent
above the reference tariff),19s the system of double disapproval applies.
Under this system, a tariff is deemed to be approved if the Member
States concerned do not, within 30 days of the airlines' application for
approval, reject the requested tariff.19' While it applies to a small number
of tickets only, the double disapproval system enables the Member States
and the EC Commission, to gain practical experience with the procedure.
This is important when one takes into consideration that, beginning Jan-
uary 1, 1993, the double disapproval system will be applied to all
tariffs. 95
c. Double Approval
A tariff proposed by an airline that is neither within one of the flexi-
bility zones nor above the reference tariff, must be approved explicitly by
both governments.'96 In such a case, the tariff is deemed to be approved if
neither one of the governments involved rejects the tariff within 21 days
upon receipt of the application.19 Tariffs subject to the double approval
system are most likely to be below the deep discount zone. The Member
States, it seems, were not prepared to give up their strict control over
these tariffs.
2. Investigation and Consultation Procedure
The Tariff Regulation provides control mechanisms for cases in
which a Member State challenges a tariff for lack of conformity with the
Tariff Regulation.
a. Article 5 of the Council Regulation
At the request of a Member State having a reasonable interest in the
route in question, the Commission is obliged to inquire into the conform-
ity of any previously approved tariff that does not lie within the flexibility
zones. 99 The Commission is also required to inquire whether the other
Member State has met its obligations under article 3(3) of the Regula-
tion.199 According to article 3(3),200 the Commission must investigate
whether or not an airline charges unjustifiably high tariffs that are not in
193. For a definition of the reference tariff, see supra at 186.
194. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 4(4).
195. Id. art. 12.
196. Id. art. 4(5).
197. Id.
198. Id. art. 5(1).
199. Id.
200. For the text of Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 3; text of Council
Regulation 2342/90, supra at 193.
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the best interest of consumers. It is also obliged to investigate whether
the tariffs are "dumping tariffs" aimed at the expulsion of competitors
from a given route.2 " Within 14 days of being called upon by a Member
State, the Commission must decide whether or not the tariff in question
is to remain in effect during the investigation period.202 The final decision
on all these matters must be made within two months of the receipt of
the Member State's request.20 8 Within one month after the decision, the
affected Member State may appeal to the EC Council.2 0 4
The procedure provided for by article 5 of the Tariff Regulation is an
important instrument in the hands of the Member States. The provision
enables the Member States to control a fare's development, especially if
the tariff deviates too far in one direction or another. It should be recog-
nized, however, that the possibility of an appeal by the concerned Mem-
ber State to the EC Council of Ministers adds a political dimension to the
tariff setting process which could be undesirable in light of the impor-
tance of the enforcement of EC antitrust laws.
b. Article 6 of the Council Regulation
Article 6 of the Tariff Regulation deals with cases in which tariffs
that are below the flexibility zones and have to be approved by both gov-
ernments, °1 are rejected by one government. 208 In those cases, article 6
provides for a detailed consultation and arbitration procedure.20 7 If con-
firmed by the EC Commission, the arbitrators' decision becomes binding
on both governments.20 8
3. Price Leadership
The new Regulation extends the possibilities for EC airlines to be-
come price leaders (i.e., introducing lower tariffs on an existing flight
route).2 9 Prior to November 1, 1990, the possibility for increased price
competition was limited to routes on which the Third and Fourth free-
dom rights were exercised (i.e., on intra-community non-stop connec-
tions). 10 According to the new Tariff Regulation, Community carriers
may now become price leaders when operating on the Fifth Freedom
route; provided, the tariffs proposed by the airlines remain within the
flexibility zones.2 11 Despite this limitation, the provisions are likely to
201. See Council Regulation 2342/90 supra note 9, art. 3(3).
202. Id. art. 5(2).
203. Id. art. 5(3), (4).
204. Id. art. 5(5).
205. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
206. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 6(1).
207. Id. arts. 6(1)-(9).
208. Id. art. 6(8).
209. Id. art. 3(6). For the text of art. 3, see supra at 193.
210. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra note 8, art. 4(5).
211. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 3(6).
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considerably strengthen competition on routes on which airlines of the
third, fourth, and fifth freedoms operate.
4. Other Provisions
The Tariff Regulation allows Member States to enter into or main-
tain more flexible bilateral agreements than those mentioned in article 4
of the Tariff Regulation.2" This is true, for example, of the British-Ger-
man Agreement" ' and the British-Luxembourg Air Transport Agree-
ment.2"4 Furthermore, EC Member States are required to bring their bi-
lateral agreements with third states that were granted Fifth Freedom
rights for their carriers on routes within the Community, in line with the
Tariff Regulation "at the first possible occasion," if the agreements are
contrary to the Council Regulatioi. 21 6 Most importantly, the new Regula-
tion requires that the double disapproval system be introduced by Janu-
ary 1, 1993.216
5. Scope of the Tariff Regulation
Contrary to the proposals of the EC Commission, '17 the Council did
not extend the Tariff Regulation to flights from within the EC to flights
from an EC airport to a third country. The Regulation applies only to
scheduled flights on routes between Member States.2 1 8 It should also be
noted that the new Tariff Regulation binds Member States directly.
Thus, there is no room for the Member States to exercise discretion in
the transformation and application of the Regulation. This differs signifi-
cantly from the old Tariff Directive of 1987211 that, like all Directives, left
the form and methods of implementation to the Member States.
B. Market Access and Capacity
The Council Regulation Concerning Capacity Sharing and Market
Access 220 may be divided into two parts.
1. Market Access
The Regulation explicitly grants the right of an EC carrier to fly an
international route within the Community, as part of the Third and
Fourth Freedom rights.2 1 Consequently, EC carriers that operate under
the Third and Fourth Freedom rights have free access to all EC air-
212. Id. art. 7.
213. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
214. See Air Route Agreement, supra at 47.
215. Id. art. 11.
216. Id. art. 12.
217. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex I, art. 1.
218. See Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 9, art. 1.
219. See Council Directive 87/601/EEC, supra at 8.
220. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra at 9.
221. Id. arts. 4, 5(1).
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ports.22 2 At the same time, the Regulation requires Member States (coun-
try of destination) to allow, on the basis of reciprocity, airlines that oper-
ate internationally and are registered in another Member State (country
of registration) to make use of the Third and Fourth Freedom rights on
the same route.2
3
The reciprocity requirement is controversial as it allows a Member
State to make the introduction of new routes or frequencies on an ex-
isting route conditional upon the receipt of the same number of new
routes or frequencies for its airlines. The reciprocity rule can have the
effect that a carrier based at a slot-tight airport (i.e., British Airways in
London-Heathrow, England) maybe unable to obtain new frequencies at,
or routes to, less frequently used airports (e.g., Lisbon, Portugal) unless
an airline of that country (e.g., TAP Air Portugal) attains route rights for
London-Heathrow. While it may be detrimental to large carriers operat-
ing out of slot-tight airports, the reciprocity requirement may be benefi-
cial to smaller carriers operating out of less frequented airports as they
may use their leverage power to gain access to the slot-tight airport.
a. Multiple Designation
The new Regulation reduces the threshold for multiple designations
on a country-pair basis."" Since January 1, 1991, a Member State must
agree to a multiple designation by another state on a given bilateral route
if there were more than 140,000 passengers travelling on the route or
more than 800 return flights in the preceding year.22 5 Effective January 1,
1992, however, the threshold will be reduced to 100,000 passengers or 600
return flights per year and route.2 The Regulation opens the way for EC
Member States to allow more than one airline to service a particular
route. As a result, a route that has previously been limited to a single
carrier per country, may in the future be served by more than one carrier.
b. Fifth Freedom Rights
In addition, the Regulation extends the possibility for airlines to ex-
ercise Fifth Freedom rights.2 2 7 Under the First Phase Decision, an airline
was only allowed to use 30 percent of its annual carrying capacity on a
given route for Fifth Freedom service.2 8 Under the new Regulation, it is
possible to use up to 50 percent of the seating capacity per flight plan
period on any given route.22 9 The 20 percent increase constitutes modest
improvement towards more competition. Unfortunately, the Council did
222. There are a few exceptions to this general rule, see id. art. 1(4).
223. Id. arts. 5(1), (2).
224. Id. art. 6.
225. Id. art. 6(2).
226. Id.
227. Id. art. 8.
228. See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra note 8, art. 8(1).
229. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 8(1).
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not follow the Commission's proposal to allow carriers to make use of
their rights of the Fifth Freedom in regard to third countries, if such
countries agree.2"' Thus, there is considerable room for further liberaliza-
tion in the future.
c. Public Service Obligation
Under the new Regulation, an airline may be required to service re-
gional airports within its home country."3' In order to fall within this cat-
egory of airports, however, the airport must be of paramount importance
to the economic development of the region concerned.2 32
d. Inter-regional Air Service
The 1990 Regulation replaces the Inter-regional Air Services Direc-
tive of 1983.111 Inter-regional air transport is now subject to the new Mar-
ket Access and Capacity Sharing Regulation. To a limited extent, the
1990 Regulation protects airlines that service regional airports and that
have opened new routes, against carriers operating with larger aircraft.3 4
To protect regional carriers, the reciprocity requirement is not applied for
a period of two years; provided, the carrier has been granted the privilege
to fly a new route between two regional airports within the Community."3 '
The reciprocity rule comes into effect again, however, if a foreign carrier
with an aircraft carrying no more than 80 passengers intends to fly the
same route. 36
e. Reverse Discrimination and Cabotage
It is important to call attention to two provisions that were part of
the Commission's proposals23 7 that the Council, however, did not include
in the 1990 Tariff Regulation.
The Commission had proposed a clause according to which each
Member State was required to allow more than one airline in its own
territory to offer scheduled flights, if certain financial and technical crite-
ria were met.23s The Council, however, was of the opinion that the new
Regulation should not interfere with the relationship between a Member
State's government and carriers registered in that Member State.3 9 Con-
sequently, there is always a possibility that domestic carriers may be dis-
230. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 8 No. 2.
231. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 5(3).
232. Id. art. 5(3).
233. For details of the Inter-regional Air Service Directive, see supra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text.
234. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 5(4).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 3(1), 9.
238. Id. art. 3(1).
239. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
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criminated against under the laws of its country of registration. Under
the new Regulation, it is still possible that an EC Member State would
deny a carrier that is registered under its laws the ability to offer certain
air services, only to allow a carrier registered under the laws of another
Member to do so. It seems to have been impossible to obtain majority
within the Council for the Commission's proposal because the adoption of
the Commission's proposal would, in effect, have resulted in the loss of
national sovereignty rights which the Member States were not prepared
to accept at this point in time. Accordingly, the problem of reverse dis-
crimination of domestic carriers continues to exist and there continues to
be no relief under EC laws to remedy this situation.
Furthermore, the Council did not adopt the Commission's cabotage
rights proposal. According to this proposal, the Member States were to
introduce, beginning in 1990, cabotage rights for Community airlines to a
limited extent.2 40 The Council stated, however, that it found it "desira-
ble" to take further liberalization measures with respect to market access
and capacity sharing, including the introduction of a cabotage rule by
June 30, 1992.241 It remains to be seen whether the Council will meet its
own deadline. It should be noted that the deadline stated in the Regula-
tion creates no legal obligation on the part of the Council to act.
2. Capacity Sharing
Starting with the 60:40 capacity sharing ratio that came into effect on
October 1, 1989,242 the new Regulation allows Community carriers to ex-
tend their seating capacity, beginning on November 1, 1990, by 7.5 per-
cent per flight plan period.2 43 At the request of a Member State, the Com-
mission may, however, limit the growth in capacity, if the capacity
increase results in substantial damage to a carrier registered in that
Member State. 244
It is worth noting that the new Regulation states as one of its objec-
tives, the full dismantling of barriers regarding capacity sharing between
Member States by January 1, 1993.245 This has, however, already been
implemented for all regional flights within the EC, effective November 1,
1990, regardless of the seating capacity of the aircraft used. 24 6 Unfortu-
nately, the Regulation again does not go as far as' the Commission's origi-
nal proposal. The Commission had suggested that capacity limits also be
240. For details see COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 9.
241. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, preamble.
242. See Council Decision 87/602/EEC, supra note 8, art. 3(2).
243. See Council Regulation 2343/90, supra note 9, art. 11(1): It should be noted that
the summer flight plan period lasts from April 1 until October 31, the winter period from
November 1 until March 31.
244. See id. art. 12(1).
245. Id. art. 11(2).
246. Id. art. 11(3).
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dismantled for flights between category I airports and regional airports. 24 7
Such a measure would have benefitted international air services between
regional airports and large airports. At the same time it would have re-
lieved the pressure on major European airports that are already heavily
congested.
C. Antitrust Provisions
The EEC Council Regulation 2344/9024 which forms part of the Sec-
ond Phase, should be mentioned as well. The Regulation consists of one
provision only. This provision empowers the Commission to continue to
exempt, until December 31, 1992, certain airline practices and airline
agreements from the EC antitrust laws.249 The Council did not, however,
follow the Commission's proposal concerning amendments and extensions
of Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87.250 The Council's failure to
adopt the Commission's proposal is regretful because the Council simply
ignored the holding of the European Court of Justice in the Ahmed
Saeed case 251 concerning the application of articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty to flights to third countries and domestic flights.252
VIII. OTHER AIR TRAFFIC PROBLEMS
The degree of competition that may develop in air transport within
the EC, depends to a large extent upon the available infrastructure, in-
cluding runways, air traffic control systems, and slots. In this area a num-
ber of problems exist. With the expected growth in air traffic, 253 these
problems are likely to become more severe. It has been said that, in Eu-
rope, chaos on the ground and in the air is no longer a myth, but nearly a
reality.25 4 Necessary changes and improvements will be extraordinarily
expensive. At a number of European airports, such as Frankfurt, Madrid,
and London-Heathrow, slots are no longer available during peak hours.
The shortage of slots makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for new
airlines to enter the market.2 5 Also, the European air traffic control sys-
247. See COM(89) 373 final (Sept. 8, 1989), Annex II, art. 12 (3).
248. See Council Regulation 2344/90, supra at 9.
249. Id. art. 1.
250. See COM(89) 417 final (Sept. 8, 1989).
251. See Ahmed Saeed, 38 ZLW at 124. See also supra notes 155-76 and accompanying
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years. See Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Oct. 30, 1989, at 26.
254. According to a Stanford Research Institute study that was prepared for IATA,
European air traffic is likely to collapse unless there is a radical improvement in the organi-
zation of air traffic, especially in the field of air traffic control and the capacity of larger
airports. See Frankfurter Allgerneine Zeitung, May 3, 1990, at R13.
255. The great importance of attractive slots for new market entries could be observed
in the case of the German airline newcomer "German Wings." The company went out of
business less than a year after its entry, mainly because "German Wings" was unable to
attain peak-hour slots. See Die Zeit, May 4, 1990, at 32.
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tern is technically outdated and still largely based upon the traditional
system of national air space control.2 " Internationally integrated air traf-
fic control systems, such as Eurocontrol, are, unfortunately, still of rela-
tively little significance. 5 7 The lack of a modern international control sys-
tem within the Community is a technological and political anachronism
at a time when the completion of the Single European Market is less than
two years away.
The Commission has already made a number of proposals to the
Council in an attempt to solve the problems mentioned.25 Additional
proposals have also been announced. " New initiatives regarding to air-
port fees, 6 0 EC-wide air traffic control, and slot allocation are being pro-
posed2 61 Moreover, the Commission is presently attempting to obtain a
power of attorney from the Member States to negotiate, on behalf of the
EC as a whole, air transport agreements with third countries. "2 A com-
prehensive package of complementary measures will be necessary if the
opportunities provided by the Second Package of liberalization are to be
realized. Most importantly, one should not forget about the safety of air-
craft. In the United States, this aspect of deregulation has proved to be
increasingly important in an expanding and competitive market for air
transport services.
262
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The Second Phase of liberalization of EC air transport has resulted
in changes to the existing system in a number of respects. In the areas of
market access, tariffs and capacities it constitutes considerable progress
towards the creation of more competitive and more market oriented
structures. State controls have been dismantled. These are all positive
achievements. However, there is still a number of important issues that
need to be solved. These issues include, but are not limited to, cabotage
rights and reverse discrimination of domestic carriers as well as a techni-
cally updated air traffic infrastructure. Thus, a Third Package of air
transport liberalization is needed if the Single European Market in the
air transport sector is to be completed by January 1, 1993.
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